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Abstract
The present paper examines the effect of the in-
ternal mechanisms of corporate governance (CG) on 
the firm’s bankruptcy. For this purpose, a sample of 76 
firms enlisted in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during a 
9-year period (2001-2009) was selected and examined. 
Cox regression was used to test the hypotheses. The 
criteria used for the CG system mechanisms include: 
board size, CEO replacement and CEO dual position. 
Control variables include:  firm size, profitability, inter-
est coverage ratio, liquidity, financial risk and operating 
risk. The results indicate that there is a significant rela-
tionship between CEO replacement and bankruptcy but 
no significant association was observed between board 
size and CEO dual position with the bankruptcy.
Keywords: CG, Bankruptcy, Longitudinal data, 
Cox Regression
Introduction
CG consists of a set of relationships between share-
holders, managers and auditors of a firm which ensures 
the establishment of a control system in order to protect 
the retail shareholders’ rights and exact implementation 
of the assembly’s resolutions and preventing potential 
abuses. This law, which is based on accountability sys-
tem and social responsibility, is a set of duties and re-
sponsibilities which should be performed by the firm’s 
constitutes in order to lead to accountability and trans-
parency. In the past, the CG focused on firm’s leader-
ship rather than its control; but today this has found 
broader dimensions and includes control, too.
Currently, enterprises are acting in a highly vari-
able and competitive environment. Rapid and cor-
rect response to the highly variable market condi-
tions has a great role in the enterprises’ position. 
With the development of monetary and financial 
markets and consequently, the dominance of a com-
petitive situation, many bankrupt firms are excluded 
from competition.  This brings concern for capital 
owners who look for methods to predict financial 
crises of the firm in order to prevent the loss of their 
capital principle and interest. Financial crisis, and 
ultimately, the bankruptcy of the enterprises can 
lead to huge losses in both micro and macro levels 
(Purheidari and Koopaei 2010). Financial crisis 
in Mexico 1994, unprecedented financial crisis in 
East Asia 1997, in Brazil and the liberated Russian 
economy in 1998, and Argentine’s disastrous crisis, 
Enron crisis in U.S. and housing crisis 2005, and the 
major financial crisis in 230 years of American his-
tory in 2008, all indicate the renewal and stability of 
crises (Iravani 2009). Due to some factors such as 
the recent wave of scandals in joint stock companies 
such as Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom in the U.S. 
Congress, Marconi in England, and Royal Ahold 
in Netherlands, the firm leadership system has be-
come the focus of market activists. The above scan-
dals clearly point to the necessity of improvement in 
firm leadership system mechanisms and increased 
accounting transparency (Abdullah 2006).
On the other hand, with the expansion of firms 
and financial institutes, the danger of the separation 
of ownership from management is felt which can lead 
to financial crisis. In fact, with the formation of a del-
egation relationship, the conflict of interest occurs be-
tween managers and shareholders.  That is, managers 
may act opportunistically, taking decisions in their own 
interests and in the shareholders’ conflict of interests. 
The need of CG (firm leadership system) is raised from 
the conflict of interest (Mehrani, et al 2010).
CG is created to provide for the possibility of control 
and balance between managers and shareholders’ inter-
ests and as a result, reduced delegation contrast. Thus, 
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firms with better CG quality should have less delegation 
contrast (Iazadinia and Rassaeian 2010). CG aligns the 
goals of various groups and tries to prevent financial 
distress (FD) and create value. In fact, the CG mecha-
nisms are an instrument to protect the shareholders’ in-
terests against financial crises and fluctuations.
Statement of Problem
Relationship between CG Features and Financial 
Crises
Theoretical link between CG and financial cri-
ses is rooted in organizational theory literature from 
which it is inferred that organizations often change 
CG and board structure when they havedescending 
trend and/or face financial crises.  It is believed that 
the board has a major role in CG especially in moni-
toring the top-level management’s performance. The 
board has the power to employ and expel the em-
ployees and also to determine the salaries of top-level 
managers and to remove the conflict of interests be-
tween managers and shareholders (Purzamani 2007).
Board Members’ Independence
The level of the board of directors’ independence is 
usually measured in one of two ways: through the num-
ber of directors and simultaneous occupation/non oc-
cupation of two organizational positions by the CEO, 
that is, whether both positions of chairperson and CEO 
are simultaneously occupied by the same person or not.
A. CEO’s dual position
In delegation theory, the CEO and chairperson po-
sitions should be totally separated in order to increase 
the board’s control and supervision in the firm. Assign-
ing the position of chairperson and CEO to two differ-
ent persons leads to reduced CEO power in the entire 
complex and increased power of the board to perform 
its supervision tasks at the best. That is, the board will 
be free to examine and evaluate the CEO’s performance 
which has a positive effect on corporate performance.
B. Board size
 The theoretical literature provides two contrasting 
views on the role of board size on its autonomy. The first 
states that a large board leads to delegation problems be-
cause some directors may act as disinterested individuals 
and also control and supervision over the CEO would 
not be efficient. The second view states that a smaller 
board is deprived of the advantages and benefits of spe-
cialized and various advantages, ideas and suggestions. 
A small board may be easily controlled by the CEO 
while a larger one would be more difficult to control.
CEO Replacement
CG legislators have concluded that CEO is in-
fluential on the board as a source of executive power. 
The successive crisis theory suggests that CEO re-
placement leads to disorders in firm’s business because 
it weakens the organizational spirit and increases the 
uncertainty and conflict. This is indeed an early warn-
ing of the potential financial crisis (Purzamani 2007).
Research Background
Domestic Studies
Hasas Yeganeh (2005)  states that with the share-
holders being more active, the management will be 
better supervised and delegation problems decrease.
Purzamani (2007) in a study of CG and bankruptcy 
prediction, examined the realization of status quo own-
ership structure and the CG theory in Iran. Logit regres-
sion analysis showed no significance relationship be-
tween ownership structure, board’s feature and audit’s 
opinion with the possibility of financial crisis found.
International Studies
Brancho, Fernando and Alexandro (Abdullah 
2006) examined the relationship between CG and 
bankruptcy with regard to the debts amounts. The 
results show that better CG firms have lower cost of 
debt and higher credit while more supervision and 
enforcing more strict  laws on bankruptcy has a pos-
itive effect on the  debts amounts.
Chang (2009) examining the relationship be-
tween CG features in financially distressed Thai firms 
concluded that firms with independent boards (hav-
ing above two percent non-bound board members) 
are affected by crisis and FD less than those with low 
percentages of non-bound directors.   Also the results 
show a positive link between board size and FD.
Parker et al. (2002) examined the relationship be-
tween CG and bankruptcy prediction using survival 
analysis. They explored how the CG features (credi-
tors’ partnership, board size, and CEO replacement) 
affected the prediction of financial crises. Survival 
analysis techniques including C.P.H1 regression was 
used to study the firm’s evolutionary route over time. 
The results showed that detained firms with CEO 
replacement experienced bankruptcy twice as much 
other firms. Also, there is no significant relationship 
between the proxy of creditors’ intervention and part-
nership and the changes in the combination and size 
of the board with bankruptcy.
1Cox Proportional Hazards
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Chitnumra et al. (2002) examined the relationship 
between CG and restructuring after bankruptcy using a 
sample of 111 Thai firms (public and private) based on 
delegation theory, exploring the associations between 
ownership centralization, rewards in cash paid to the 
employees by liquidator, number of planning directors 
outside the board and the number of liquidators out-
side the board with the firm’s performance after bank-
ruptcy using OLS regression for hypothesis testing. 
The results showed that supervision and management 
incentive affected the firm’s performance after bank-
ruptcy. Also the type of the firm (public/private) was a 
significant factor in this respect. In addition, both su-
pervision and incentive led to reduced delegation costs 
and management transformation by the board led to 
increased shareholder’s motivation and maximized 
their efficiency; but no significant relationship was 
found between the outside directors’ variables.
 Marzuki jun (2005) examined the relationship 
between CG and bankruptcy in Malaysia using the 
following hypotheses:
1. Do CG features influence the bankruptcy 
probability?
2. To what extent do financial indices (profit-
ability, liquidity, financial leverage) affect the bank-
ruptcy probability?
Using CG variables including board combina-
tion, ownership structure and leadership structure 
and comparing healthy and unhealthy firms and us-
ing logistic and binary regression, she found no sig-
nificant link between CG features and bankruptcy 
in Malaysia. She found a difference between profit-
ability and liquidity ratios and that unhealthy firms 
had less profitability and liquidity than healthy ones.
Research Hypotheses
Given the background and exploratory studies, 
it is hypothesized that:
H1. There is a significant relationship between 
CEO replacement and bankruptcy.
H2. There is a significant relationship between 
board size and bankruptcy.
H3. There is a significant relationship between 
CEO’s dual position and bankruptcy.
Research Methodology
The present paper uses survival analysis method 
along with longitudinal data. The survival analysis 
studies the time period before an event occurs or the 
time interval between events. This model uses the 
survival time or risk rate as dependent variable. In 
bankruptcy case, the goal is to quantify the relation-
ship between survival time and a set of explanatory 
variables. The risk set and risk rate are two main 
concepts of this model. Risk set includes individu-
als subject to risk and endangered by the incidence 
of an event in any given time period. In a discrete 
model, the risk rate, also known as failure rate, cal-
culates the probability of an event at a given time 
for a specific entity, assuming that that entity is sub-
ject to risk in that period.This definition is not valid 
for a continuous model because the probability of 
an event occurring exactly at a specific time is ex-
tremely small. Various models have been presented 
for survival analysis the most common of which is 
that developed by Cox in 1972 (Alikhani2006 ).
The model’s overall form is as follows:
Bankruptcy=b
1 
CEO Replacement+b
2 
CEO’s Dual Position +b
3 
Board Size+b
4 
Operating Risk +b
5 
Financial Risk+ 
+b
6 
Profitability +b
7 
Liquidity +b
8
Firm Size+b
9 
Interest Coverage Ratio+ε                                      (1)
In this model, the dependent variable is Bank-
ruptcy. Firms whose accumulated loss is at least 
more than 50% of their capital are considered as 
bankrupt assigned the code 1; otherwise (healthy 
firms) are assigned thecode zero.
Independent variables are:
CEO Replacement: is the same as the CEO’s 
tenure which is the number of the years the CEO 
occupies this position.
Board Size: logarithm of the number of directors
CEO’s Dual Position: refers to the case when 
the tasks of CEO and chairpersonare both assigned 
to the same person code 1, otherwise zero.
Control variables (accounting indices) are as 
follows:
Financial risk: Current liabilities / Current assets 
Interest coverage ratio: Earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) / Total interest
Operating risk: Total assets / Total sales
Firm size: Logarithm of total assets
Liquidity: Current assets / Current liabilities
Profitability index: Earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) / Sales
ε :value of the error term in the regression model
Research Scope
Given the importance of the issue, the time, place 
and subject scopes of the research are as follows:
Temporal scope: a 9-year period between 2001 
and 2009.
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Spatial scope: firms enlisted in TSE
Subject scope: effect of some CG features in-
cluding board size, CEO replacement and CEO’s 
dual position on bankruptcy using survival analysis.
Population and Sample
The population includes all firms enlisted in 
TSE during a 9-year period (2001-2009). Systematic 
elimination was applied for sampling. Firms whose 
fiscal years not ending March 20 were excluded; 
then banks and investment firms were excluded be-
cause of different natures of their activities. Finally, 
marginal observations (first and 99th percentiles of 
all observations) were eliminated.Also, in this stage, 
firms which did not have available information for 
the study period were eliminated. Thus, only 76 
firms were included in the sample for models esti-
mation and hypothesis testing.
Table 1.Descriptive statistics about the firms
In
du
st
ry
 c
od
e
Industry type
N
um
be
r 
of
 th
e 
fir
m
s 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e
1 Vehicles and parts manufacturing 5
2
Manufacturing radio, television, and 
communication devices
2
3 Metal products 5
4 Other Non-metallic  products 6
5 Cement, lime, chalk 8
6 Essential metals 6
7 Tile and ceramics 5
8 Rubber and plastic 6
9 Machinery and equipment 3
10 Electrical machinery and devices 1
11 Chemicals 5
12 Food products except sugar 7
13 Textile 2
14 Pharmaceuticals 7
15 Other industries 8
Total 76
Data Collection
The financial statements presented to the TSE 
and other relevant information sources such as 
TADBIR PARDAZ and RAHAVARD NOVIN data 
bankswere used for data collection.
Data Analysis
Survival time is a non-negative random variable 
which cannot be examined by standard statistical 
methods because of its two specific features. First, 
real survival time can be more than study period and 
cannot be measured completely. Also in many clini-
cal studies, the participants exit the study before it 
has completed. Such incomplete data are referred to 
as censored data.For the same reason using ordinary 
statistical methods is not efficient in survival time.
Second, this variable follows the skewed distri-
bution rather than normal (Parker et al 2002). This 
is why Cox regression is applied herein.
After data preparation in Excel software, they 
were analyzed by SPSS ver.18.
Bankruptcy Modeling
Model’s Fit
Cox relative risk model was used as follows in 
order to indicate the effect of CG features on bank-
ruptcy time.
1 1 2 2 p p
( )
Exp�{�b x �b x � �b x }
h.(t)
h t
= + + …          (2)
where h(t) is the risk rate indicating the probability of 
bankruptcy if not happened yet; h
0
(t) is the baseline risk 
rate, determined when independent variables are zero. 
In fact, the risk rate equals the product of an exponen-
tial figure multiplied by h
0
(t) function, which depends 
on regression factors and independent variables.
h(t)=h
0
(t) exp { b
1
x
1
 + b
2
x
2
 +… +b
p
x
p
}         (3)
Model’s Significance Test
Given the values (Chi-square=115.119 and 
Sig.=0.000) it is observed that the test statistic is in 
H0 rejection area. Thus, there is at least one influ-
ential variable and there is no reason to reject the 
entire model’s significance. 
The regressive method has been used in mod-
eling that is, first all variables enter the model and 
then, insignificant ones exit thereof invarious steps. 
This model forms three steps. Step one is as follows:
1 2
( )
    
h.(t)
h t
liquidity b financial risk b= +          (4) 
Results of the primary fit of Cox model show 
that only liquidity and financial risk variable are 
present in the model (sig<0.05) which will be final if 
possessing other conditions of Cox model.
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Table 2.Model significance test results Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficientsa,b
-2 Log 
Likelihood
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square Df Sig. Chi-square Df Sig.
368.140 115.199 9 .000 46.170 9 .000 46.170 9 .000
Model Assumptions Control
Risks Proportionality Assumption
Since establishing the risks proportionality as-
sumption is one of the most important fit assump-
tions  of  Cox model,  the commonest way to verify 
it is the graphical method. Fig.1 and parallel lines 
illustrates the proportionality of the risks.
Marginal Data
The figure below indicates the dispersion of de-
viation residuals for Cox model. Given the form of 
the observations, three data are marginal.
Influential Data Detection
Fig.3 illustrates delta-beta graph for Cox model. 
It is clear that exclusion of marginal data changes 
the regression factor.
Table 3. Results of the first step
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
CEO’s dual position 0.227 0.607 0.139 1.000 0.709 1.254
CEO replacement 0.230 0.122 3.532 1.000 0.060 1.258
Liquidity -1.353 0.499 7.359 1.000 0.007 0.258
Operating risk 0.092 0.103 0.791 1.000 0.374 1.096
Interest coverage ratio -0.001 0.001 0.495 1.000 0.482 0.999
Profitability -0.009 0.045 0.041 1.000 0.840 0.991
Firm size -0.104 0.131 0.630 1.000 0.427 0.901
Board size -1.506 2.512 0.359 1.000 0.549 0.222
Financial risk 0.363 0.102 12.554 1.000 0.000 1.438
Figure 1. Risks Proportionality Verification
Finalized Model
Excluding the marginal data, the model is final-
ized as follows.  = b
1 
CEO replacement + b
2   
li-
quidity + b
3 
profitability
Figure 2. Deviation  residuals Figure 3. Delta-beta graph for influential data detection
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The results of  final fit of Cox  model (Table 
4) indicate that only CEO replacement, liquid-
ity and profitability variables are present in the 
model (sig<0.05). Model coefficients show that 
by increasing the CEO replacement variable, the 
bankruptcy risk increases; and by increasing the 
liquidity and profitability, the risk of bankrupt-
cy decreases. The relative  risk>1 shows that by 
increasing the independent variable, the bank-
ruptcy risk increases and relative  risk <1 shows 
that by increasing the independent variable the 
bankruptcy risk deceases. For instance, the rela-
tive risk of CEO replacement is 1.330 which in-
dicates that for each unit increase in this value, 
the bankruptcy risk will increase by 33.0%.
Conclusions
In the first hypothesis, by examining the rela-
tionship between CEO replacement and bankrupt-
cy, the results indicated a significant relationship 
which supports H1.  Positive relationship existing 
between the aforesaid variables (CEO replacement 
and bankruptcy) indicates that firms experiencing 
CEO replacement successively are subject to bank-
ruptcy more than others.
H2 verified the relationship between board 
size and bankruptcy. The results indicate that 
there is no significant relationship, thus H2 is 
rejected.
H3 verified the relationship between CEO’s 
dual position and bankruptcy which the model es-
timations show an insignificant relationship thus 
rejecting H3 as well.
Table 4. Final step information
B SE Wald Df Sig. Exp (B)
CEO’s dual position 0.159 0.622 0.065 1.000 0.799 1.172
CEO replacement 0.285 0.122 5.466 1.000 0.019 1.330
Liquidity -1.634 0.613 7.095 1.000 0.008 0.195
Operating risk 0.129 0.164 0.614 1.000 0.433 1.138
Interest coverage ratio -0.019 0.011 3.298 1.000 0.069 0.981
Profitability -1.500 0.477 9.891 1.000 0.002 0.223
Firm size 0.116 0.147 0.623 1.000 0.430 1.123
Board size -1.289 2.504 0.265 1.000 0.607 0.276
Financial risk 0.194 0.289 0.448 1.000 0.503 1.214
( )
 0.285   –  1.613  –  1.5 
h.(t)
h t
CEO replacement liquidity profitability=
 
Suggestiions for further research 
It is suggested that for a further use of the re-
sults herein and also to help clarify the relationship 
between CG mechanisms and FD in the future, the 
followings should be taken into consideration.
Examining the effect of macroeconomic variables 
on the relationship between CG mechanisms and FD
Examining and testing the relationships between 
CG mechanisms and FDusing  other models of FD 
determination
Replicating the present study using the time in-
tervals and examining the effect of  increased inter-
vals on improved model prediction
Given the relatively high level of oscillations in 
economic, cultural and political factors affecting 
the firms in our country, it is suggested that future 
studies use a non-linear regression in determining 
the relationship between CG mechanisms and FD.
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